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"If the race of government bullying were a contest between different agencies,
the EPA would take the crown."2 - U.S. Senator Rand Paul
I. INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") was established by
executive action in 1970 under the Nixon administration "to make a coordinated attack on the pollutants which debase the air we breathe, the water we
drink, and the land that grows our food."' Despite more humble beginnings,

1.
Hunter S. Higgins is a recent graduate of the Pepperdine University School of Law.
Thanks to Dean Shelley Saxer for her patience, guidance, and comments throughout this process.
2. RAND PAUL, GOVERNMENT BULLIES 5 (2012); See PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, PLF
sues over EPA's illegal compliance order against Wvoming farumer's environmentally friendly
stock pond, https://www.pacificlegal.org/Cases/Case-johnson-1-1494 (last visited Mar. 26, 2017)
(summarizing Andyjohnson v. EPA where the EPA threatened fines nearing $16 million for Mr.
Johnson's damming of a small creek on his front yard creating a "stock pond" to provide water
for his livestock. The EPA argued the pond constituted "navigable waters" and his conduct violated the Clean Water Act. The case eventually settled wherein the EPA allowed him to keep
his pond and pay no fine.).
3. See Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress About Reorganization Plans To
Establish the EnvironmentalProtectionAgency and the National Oceanicand Atmospheric Administration (July 9, 1970), THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Mar. 26, 2017), http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.phppid-2575.
305

306

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 20

the EPA has since quadrupled in staff to become an administrative behemoth,'
with more than 15,000 employees and an annual budget nearing $8.2 billion.
Alongside the Agency's rapid growth has emerged a similarly large bodywork
of regulations, many of which have ripened into unnecessarily complicated
rules' and, at times, proven unconstitutional in their application.'
Nowhere has this problem manifested itself more than in the Clean Water
Act ("CWA").' Passed in 1972, the CWA authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to issue permits' and generally regulate the discharge of pollutants into "navigable waters.""o Understanding how the EPA and Corps determine if a given property contains such "navigable waters,"" however, has
become "notoriously unclear."" This, in large part, is because the Act ambiguously self-defines the term as any "waters of the United States." Yet, when
Congress passed the CWA, the phrase "waters of the United States" was "not a
term of art with a known meaning; and the words themselves are hopelessly
indeteninate."" To make matters worse, courts are generally unable to resolve
the language as precedent dictates and must defer to an agency's discretion in
reasonably interpreting statutory ambiguities."
Thus, with a reticent Congress and a seemingly powerless Court, the
phrases "navigable waters" and "waters of the United States" potentially subject
4. RAND PAUL, GOVERNMENT BULLIES 5 (2012) (finding the EPA's regulations cost an
amount equal to the combined costs of defense and homeland security).
5. See EPA's Budget and Spending, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget (last
updated Oct. 4, 2016); see also, Nancy Madsen, Rep. Morgan Griffith says EPA job growth outstips [sic] that of U.S. government, POLITIFACT (Apr. 14, 2014) (finding "from 1972 until 2011,
the number of EPA employees increased by 107 percent while the number of total federal personnel decreased by 15 percent."), http://www.politifact.com/virginia/statements/2014/apr/I4/
morgan-griffith/rep-morgan-griffith-says-epa-job-growth-outstips-u/.
6. See CHAMBERS ASSOCIATE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw (2016), lttp://www.chambersassociate.com/practiceareas/environment (last visited Mar. 26, 2017) ("The Clean Air Act - 'one of the
most complex pieces of legislation on the books' according to Hunton & Williams partner Bill
Brownell.").
7. This article will discuss the various ways in which the EPA and Corps operate outside the
boundaries of traditional administrative agency power. This may occur through courts lending
too much deference to the agency, Congress failing to resolve poorly worded legislation, or improper agency rulemaking. Recent indications from the Bench have indicated the possibility that
the CWA may be unconstitutionally void; see e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015)
(holding the EPA improperly considered the costs to utilities and others in the energy industry
when it set standards for regulating hazardous air pollutants emitted by power plants).
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1972) (the CWA is the United States' primary federal law governing
pollution of the nation's waters).
9. Sce Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/clean-wateract-section-404 (last visited Mar. 26, 2017) (authorizing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to
issue permits).
10. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a); see gencrally 33 C.F.R. §§ 320-332 (2017); §S 40 C.F.R. 230-232
(2017).
11. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2014) (defining navigable waters as "the waters of the United States,
including territorial seas.").
12. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (2012) (Alitoj., concurring).

13.

33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2014).

14. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (2012) (Alito,J., concurring).
15. Sec infra Part III (referring to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which sets out a two-pronged for judicial review of agency interpretations of law whereby agency interpretations get deference.).
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"the entire land area of the United States" to EPA and Corps jurisdiction." Despite the Court's many attempts 7 to curtail the scope of the CWA, the EPA and
Corps have empowered themselves with "an essentially limitless grant of authority" for more than four decades." From protecting "obviously navigable and
important waterways like the Mississippi River" to adjudicating "ephemeral
drainages that will only hold water . . . during significant storms,"' the CWA
presents a stark illustration of how a seemingly limitless scope of authority can
often lead to an abuse of power."o
This Article will focus primarily on the distortion of the Clean Water Act
and the subsequent fostering of the administrative state. Part II will provide a
contextual background of the evolving interpretation of "navigable waters" and
"waters of the United States," both inside and outside the courtroom. Looking
to the interpretation of "navigable waters" inside the Supreme Court, Part II will
analyze several cases, two of which occurred in 2016 and deal directly with the
ambiguity." Part II will then provide a background of the EPA's recent promulgation of the highly controversial "waters of the United States" ("WOTUS")
rule currently stayed by the Sixth Circuit.' The discussion will juxtapose the
Court's attempt to narrow the definition of "navigable waters" against the EPA
and Corps' steps taken, both informally and formally, to avoid Court holdings.
Part III will look at the EPA's prominent role in the rise of the modern administrative state. It will analyze whether the Agency's repudiation of the Court's
intent, taken in the totality, should preclude the Court from granting such generous deference to the EPA and Corps in interpreting the CWA. Lastly, the

16. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 722 (2006) ("In the last three decades, the Corps
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have interpreted their jurisdiction over 'the
waters of the United States' to cover 270-to-300 million acres of swampy lands in the United
States-including half of Alaska and an area the size of California in the lower 48 States. And that
was just the beginning. The Corps has also asserted jurisdiction over virtually any parcel of land
containing a channel or conduit-whether man-made or natural, broad or narrow, permanent or
ephemeral-through which rainwater or drainage may occasionally or intermittently flow. On this
view, the federally regulated 'waters of the United States' include storm drains, roadside ditches,
ripples of sand in the desert that may contain water once a year, and lands that are covered by
floodwaters once every 100 years. Because they include the land containing storm sewers and
desert washes, the statutory 'waters of the United States' engulf entire cities and immense arid
wastelands. In fact, the entire land area of the United States lies in some drainage basin, and an
endless network of visible channels furrows the entire surface, containing water ephemerally
wherever the rain falls. Any plot of land containing such a channel may potentially be regulated
as a 'water of the United States.'").
17. Id. at 732-739; Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1375; Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 1,59, 167-174 (2001).
18. See Sackett 132 S. Ct. at 1375.
19. David Bailey, Q&A: Pacific Legal Foundation's Francois questions U.S. waters rule,
REUTERS LEGAL (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.pacificlegal.org/file/Reuters-Tony-Francois-Q-andA.pdf.

20. See Letter from John Emerich Edward Dalberg, Lord Acton, to Bishop Mandell
Creighton, ONLINE LIBRARY OF LIBERTY (Apr. 5, 1887), http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/2201/

203934.
21.
ulation
though
22.

See Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715; see also Sold Waste Agency, 531 U.S. 159 (upholding regconstruing navigable waters to include freshwater wetlands adjacent to navigable waters,
not themselves actually navigable).
See In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2015).
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analysis will provide a caution to the reader of the burgeoning administrative
state currently permissible under the CWA, which has put the EPA and Corps
in a potentially unconstitutional position in which they may effectively enact,
enforce, and interpret their own regulations without accountability to an electorate or judicial review. Part IV will provide a summary while simultaneously
looking forward to the implications of the most recent Court holdings and President Donald Trump's policy positions.
II. BACKGROUND
The Clean Water Act's primary flaw lies in its unclear language and amorphous application of the term "navigable waters," which is circularly self-defined
in the statue as "waters of the United States." The construal of these two
phrases, often applied interchangeably, has required the Court to revisit the
phrase four times in the last fifteen years' and the Corps and EPA to promulgate, albeit unsuccessfully, a formal "waters of the United States" rule. To understand the complex interplay between these two evolutionary branches, this
Article will address each in turn.
A. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The first time the United States Supreme Court considered "navigable waters," in 1870, was to resolve an apparent gap in English common law wherein
Congress found itself without authority over the interstate commerce of a
steamer transporting goods." The inherited definition of "navigable waters"
from English common law centered on whether a given waterway was affected
by the "ebb and flow of the tide."' The Court distinguished American rivers
from those in England as "navigable in fact" by virtue of supporting large vessels
for hundreds of miles." The Court soundly rejected the common law definition
as having "no application in this country."" Instead, the Court developed a new
legal definition with a more straightforward reading of the term: "navigable waters" encompassed those bodies of water that were navigable in fact and could
support trade and travel."

23. See U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs v. H1awkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016); Sackett, 132 S.
Ct. 1367; Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715; Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. 159.
24. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 562-64 (1870).

25.

Id. at 563.

26. Id. (noting differences in American rivers from English: "There, no waters are navigable
in fact, or at least to any considerable extent, which are not subject to the tide, and from this
circumstance tide water and navigable water there signify substantially the same thing. But in this
country the case is widely different. Some of our rivers are as navigable for many hundreds of
miles above as they are below the limits of tide water, and some of them are navigable for great
distances by large vessels, which are not even affected by the tide at any point during their entire
length.").
27. Id.
28. Id. ("A different test must therefore be applied to detennine the navigability of our rivers,
and that is found in their navigable capacity. Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable
rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or
are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which
trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.").
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It was not until some 115 years later that the Court would again find itself
tasked with interpreting navigable waters, but now it would be against the backdrop of the Clean Water Act. In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., the Court upheld the Corps' interpretation that the Act covered not only
waters navigable in fact, but also "all 'freshwater wetlands' that were adjacent to
other covered waters."' Citing congressional intent," the Court unanimously
upheld the Corps' construction of the CWA capturing adjacent wetlands under
the "waters of the United States" language." As a result, the Court's first challenge to the CWA led to an expansion of Corps authority under the Act over
wetlands neighboring jurisdictional waters to even those waters not inundated
or frequently flooded by the navigable water.' This analysis would later become
known as the "significant nexus" test;' the consequences of which allowed the
EPA and Corps to continue to rely on Riverside Bayview in legal arguments
generally justifying authority over non-navigable water features, even though
those attempts have mostly failed." To date, Riverside Bayview remains the
only Supreme Court decision to uphold an agency's attempt to expand their
jurisdiction under the CWA. To that end, it may be instructive today as having
set a reasonable outer limit in answering how the Agencies should ultimately
interpret "waters of the United States" under the Act."
A case in 2001 presented the Court with another opportunity to clarify the
"waters of the United States" ambiguity, known as Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC').' In
SWANCC, the Court declined to extend the definition of "navigable waters"
under the CWA to include "an abandoned sand and gravel pit in northern Illinois" as a habitat for migratory birds." And while the Court rejected the Corps'
migratory bird jurisdiction argument, it ultimately affirmed Riverside Bayview's
conclusion that adjacent wetlands could fall within the scope of the CWA."

29. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985).
30. Id. at 133 ("Congress evidently intended to repudiate limits that had been placed on federal regulation by earlier water pollution control statutes and to exercise its powers under the
Commerce Clause to regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed 'navigable' under
the classical understanding of that term.").
31. Id. at 131.
32. See id. at 129-131 (the Court unanimously held the Corps had acted reasonably in interpreting the CWA to require permits for the discharge of fill material into wetlands adjacent to the
"waters of the United States.")
33. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,
167 (2001) ("It was the significant nexus between the wetlands and 'navigable waters' that informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside BayviewI-Iomes.").
34. Id. at 171 ("We thus decline respondents' invitation to take what they see as the next
ineluctable step after Riverside BayviewHones: holding that isolated ponds, some only seasonal,
wholly located within two Illinois counties, fall under § 404(a)'s definition of 'navigable waters').
35. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 735 (2006) (citing Riverside Bayview which
"repeatedly described the 'navigable waters' covered by the Act as 'open water' and 'open waters.'
Under no rational interpretation are typically dry channels described as 'open waters."').
36. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 162-67.
37. See id. at 162.
38. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 716 (finding Riverside Bavviewand SVANCC to have found
the "meaning of 'navigable waters' in the CWA as broader than the traditional definition.").
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Even still, the SWANCC Courtmade efforts to narrow the potentially far-reaching effects of the Riverside Bayview holding, clarifying that the "statute's text will
not allow extension of the Corps' jurisdiction" to "regulate wetlands not adjacent
to open water."' In doing so, SWANCCbecame the first of five post-Riverside
Bayview decisions to ultimately reject the government's interpretation of its jurisdiction under the CWA. The ensuing years, however, saw both agencies and
lower courts effectively side-stepping SWANCC by claiming the holding applied narrowly to "isolated" waters." To get around SWANCC, the EPA and
Corps needed only to show some modicum of a connection to a covered water
to prove non-isolation, effectively granting limitless authority since "as a matter
of basic science, all water is connected to all other water through the hydrological cycle."" This allowed the agencies to reclassify previously non-jurisdictional
isolated waters like roadside ditches" or dry desert sites saturated only during
heavy periods of rain' as "tributaries"" adjacent to navigable waters elsewhere.
Additionally, lower courts began eroding the common sense integrity of the
"significant nexus" test by upholding arguments from the agencies that "a molecule of water" and a "drop of rainwater" provided a significant enough hydrological connection to warrant jurisdiction."
With lower courts skirting the SWANCC decision, the Court did not allow another 16 years to lapse to further muddy the Act's interpretation. Instead, just
five years after SWANCC, the Court again rejected EPA and Corps' construal
of "waters of the United States" as unreasonable in the seminal case of Rapanos
39. See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 160 (emphasis added).
40. Brief of American Petroleum Institute et al., at 8-9, Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367
(2012) (No. 10-1062), 2011 WL 4872035, at *9-10.

41.

Id. at 8.

42. United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 702 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding a roadside ditch
whose water took a winding, thirty-two mile path to the Chesapeake Bay subject to the CWA).
43. Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding "washes
and arroyos" of an "arid development site," located in the middle of the desert, through which
"water courses ... during periods of heavy rain," was subject to CWA).
44. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 726-27 (2006) (finding "jurisdictional 'tributaries' include the 'intermittent flow of surface water through approximately 2.4 miles of natural
streams and manmade ditches (paralleling and crossing under 1-64),' a 'roadside ditch' whose
water took 'a winding, thirty-two-mile path to the Chesapeake Bay," irrigation ditches and drains
that intermittently connect to covered waters, and (most implausibly of all) the 'washes and arroyos' of an "arid development site," located in the middle of the desert, through which 'water
courses ... during periods of heavy rain" (citations omitted).).
45. Brief of American Petroleum Institute et al., at 9, Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012)
(No. 10-1062), 2011 WL 4872035, at *10-11. ("In California's Central Valley, for example, the
Corps had determined prior to SWANCC that two cattle waste ponds were waters of the United
States because they were used by migratory birds, and that a nearby farm ditch was non-jurisdictional. After SWANCC, the property owner asked the Corps to disclaim jurisdiction over the
ponds, only to be told that the ditch was now a tributary subject to jurisdiction, and, thus, the
waste ponds remained jurisdictional - this time because they were 'adjacent' to a tributary.").
46. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 728-29 ("One court distinguished SWANCCon the ground that
'a molecule of water residing in one of these pits or ponds [in SWANCC I could not mix with
molecules from other bodies of water'-whereas, in the case before it, 'water molecules currently
present in the wetlands will inevitably flow towards and mix with water from connecting bodies,'
and '[a] drop of rainwater landing in the Site is certain to intermingle with water from the [nearby
river].' United States v. Rueth Development Co., 189 F.Supp.2d 874, 877-78 (N.D. Ind.
2002).").
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v. United States." In Rapanos, a plurality of the Court held that a wetland that
was not adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters did not fall under the reach of the
CWA.' The plurality opinion, penned by Justice Scalia, admonished the lower
courts' refusal to follow SWANCC more narrowly" and attempted to conclusively set forth a precise boundary to the CWA's scope:
[T]he phrase "the waters of the United States" includes only those relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water
"forming geographic features" that are described in ordinary parlance
as "streams[,] . .. oceans, rivers, [and] lakes."" . . . The phrase does
not include channels through which water flows intermittently or

ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide drainage for rainfall."
To date, Rapanos remains the Court's most current definition for the "navigable waters" and "waters of the United States"" debate. Yet, perhaps more
influentially, Rapanos also marked the first meaningful discussion of the "significant nexus" test, with the plurality arguing strongly against reading a "significant
nexus" test into the statute and an oft-cited concurrence from Justice Kennedy
advocating its use.5' In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy focused on the Act's
"text, structure, and purpose" to articulate a concrete "significant nexus" test
only previously suggested in SWANCC and Riverside Bayview. ' In sum, Justice Kennedy asserted that a "significant nexus" existed over any water feature
so long as it could "either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands
in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of other covered waters more readily understood as 'navigable.""' The plurality, on the other hand, held Justice Kennedy's approach to not only mischaracterize the Court's prior holdings," but to go far beyond the Riverside Bayview

47. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 726, 728 (finding "lower courts have continued to uphold the Corps' sweeping
assertions of jurisdiction over ephemeral channels and drains as 'tributaries'" and "have also continued to define 'adjacent' wetlands broadly after SWANCC.").
50. Id. at 739; see also id. n.5 (defining "relatively permanent" to not "necessarily exclude
seasonal rivers, which contain continuous flow during some months of the year but no flow during
Common sense and common usage distinguish between a wash and seasonal
dry months ...
river.").
51. Id.; see also id. at 742 ("[Olnly those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to
bodies that are 'waters of the United States' in their own right, so that there is no clear demarcation
between 'waters' and wetlands, are 'adjacent' to such waters and covered by the Act.").
52. Brief for Respondents at 4, U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807
(2016) (No. 15-290), 2016 WL 750545, at *1.
53. Raparios, 547 U.S. at 755 (finding any wetland to "bear the 'significant nexus' of physical
connection, which makes them as a practical matter indistinguishablefrom waters of the United
States.").
54. See id. at 775-76 (KennedyJ. concurring).
55. Id. at 780 (Kennedy,J. concurring).
56. See id. at 754 (finding Justice Kennedy's approach "misreads SWANCC's 'significant
nexus' statement as mischaracterizing Riverside Bayviewto adopt a case-by-case test of ecological
significance 1.1").
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holding57 by rewriting the "gimmick of 'significant nexus"'" into the CWA." In
caustic fashion, the Rapanosplurality strongly distanced itself from Justice Kennedy, questioning the logic of a test that states "whatever (alone or in combination) affects waters of the United States is waters of the United States[.]"6 Perhaps unsurprisingly, following the Rapanos holding, the EPA and Corps
declined to follow the plurality's definition and instead began citing to justice
Kennedy's concurrence."
Five years after Rapanos' attempt to significantly rein in jurisdictional reach
under the CWA, the EPA and Corps issued an informal memorandum of guidance on how the agencies would identify "waters of the United States" under
the CWA." "Far from providing clarity and predictability, the agency's latest
informal guidance"' ignored the previous three Court holdings and instead
stated "the extent of waters over which the agencies assert jurisdiction under the
CWA will increasecompared to the extent of waters over which jurisdiction has
been asserted under existing guidance." This guidance, coupled with the more
than 120 lower courts citing Rapanos yet reaching contrary conclusions,
prompted the Court to again try to clarify the ambiguity in Sackett v. EPA."
In Sackett, Mr. and Mrs. Sackett filled in approximately one-half acre of
their residential property with dirt and rock in preparation for building a home."
Months later, the EPA determined the property contained wetlands adjacent to
a nearby lake and issued a compliance order telling them to remove the fill,
plant wetlands vegetation, wait three years, and then apply for an after-the-fact
pennit to regularize the allegedly illegal fill (which would have been removed)."
If they failed to comply, they would face fines of up to $75,000 per day."" In
other words, after the EPA had made a jurisdictional determination, private

&

57. See id. at 753-54.
58. Id. at 756 ("More fundamentally, however, the test simply rewrites the statute, using for
that purpose the gimmick of 'significant nexus.' It would have been an easy matter for Congress
to give the Corps jurisdiction over all wetlands (or, for that matter, all dry lands) that 'significantly
affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of waters of the United States. It did not do
that, but instead explicitly limited jurisdiction to 'waters of the United States.'").
59. See id. at 754-55.
60. Id. at 755.
61. See Lawrence R. Liebesman et al., Rapanos v. United States: Searching for a Significant
Nexus Using Proximate Causation and ForesecabilityPrinciples, 40 ENvTL. L. REP. NEWS
ANALYsIS 11242, 11250 (2010) (discussing that in 2008, the Agencies released a guidance memo
to EPA regions and Corps which largely hewed to the plurality opinion in Rapanos requiring the
EPA and Corps to establish a "significant nexus" between navigable waters and wetlands in order
to regulate under CWA).
62. EPA, DRArr GuIDANCE ON IDENTIFYING WATERS PROTECTED BY THE CLEAN WATER
ACT (2011), https://wvw.regulations.gov/documentD-EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0409-0002.
63. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (2012) (Alito,J. concurring).
64. EPA, DRArr GUIDANCE ON IDENTIFYING WATERS PROTECTED BY THE CLEAN WATER
AcT (2011), https://www.regulations.gov/dIocumentD-EPA-HQ-OW-201 1-0409-0002.
65. SeeJeff Kray, Five Years After Rapanos - EPA PreparesNew Clean Water Act.]urisdictional Guidance, MARTEN LAW: NEWSLETTER (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20110203-epa-prepares-new-cwa-guidance.
66. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370.
67. Sec id. at 1370-71.
68. James S. Burling, FinalAgency Actions and JudicialReview: United States Army Corps
of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 17 FEDERALIST Soc'v REV. 28, 28-29 (2016).
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property owners like the Sacketts were faced with the following choices: 1)
forego the planned use of the land; 2) begin the "arduous, expensive and long"
permitting process;" or 3) go forward and risk fines of up to $75,000 a day and
imprisonment for proceeding without a pernit"7 Yet, when the EPA denied
the Sacketts a hearing to contest its jurisdictional determination, the Sacketts
found themselves without an adequate remedy. Thus, they brought an action
in court alleging the compliance order was "arbitrary and capricious" under the
Administrative Procedure Act and its legally binding effect adjudicated property
rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment.7 ' The Court unanimously rejected
the EPA's practice and held landowners "need not assume such risks while
waiting for the EPA to 'drop the hammer' in order to have their day in court."7
Though the unanimous Sackett Court decision centered more on providing
landowners some judicial relief in challenging EPA compliance orders than on
resolving the "navigable waters" ambiguity, it marked the first time the Court
was able to, at least indirectly, provide a tangible remedy to property owners
improperly targeted under the CWA.3 In justice Alito's concurring opinion,
however, he chided the Court for merely providing a "modest measure of relief"
stating, "[a]llowing aggrieved property owners to sue under the Administrative
Procedure Act is better than nothing, but only clarification of the reach of the
Clean Water Act can rectify the underlying problem."" He further cited the
failure of "Congress [which] has done nothing to resolve this critical ambiguity,"
and the EPA's refusal to promulgate a clear and predictable rule defining the
phrase as reasons that could ultimately render Sackett unsuccessful like Rapanos and SWANCC before it0 Justice Alito's prediction was correct. Lower
courts applied Sackett narrowly, citing the decision primarily during analogous
circumstances when the EPA issued a "compliance order" alleging a violation,
rather than as a springboard to more broadly curtail the CWA's scope.76

69. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1815-16 (2016) ("ITIhe
Corps demanded that they undertake, among other things, a 'hydrogeologic assessment of the
rich fen system including the mineral/nutrient composition and pH of the groundwater; groundwater flow spatially and vertically; discharge and recharge areas'; a 'functional/resource assessment
of the site including a vegetation survey and identification of native fen plan communities across
the site'; an 'inventoryof similar wetlands in the general area (watershed), including some analysis
of their quality'; and an 'inventory of rich fen plant communities that are within sites of High and
Outstanding Biodiversity Significance in the area. Respondents estimate the undertaking these
analyses would cost more than $100,000.'").
70. See id. at 1815.
71. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371.
72. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1815; Sackctt, 132 S. Ct. at 1372.
73. See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1375-76 (2012) (Alito, J. concurring).
74. Id.
75. See id. at 1375 (Alito, J. concurring).
76. Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 761 F.3d 383, 391 (5th Cir. 2014), cert
denied sub nom. Kent Recycling Servs., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 135 S. Ct. 1548,
(2015), reh'ggranted, order vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2427, (2016) ("Prior to Sackett, all of the courts,
including ours, that had considered the question held that a JD does not determine rights or
obligations or have legal consequences and thus is not final agency action. Since Sacketts the few
courts, including the district court below, that have considered the question have reasoned to the
same conclusion. See Hawkes Co., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 963 F.Supp.2d 868, 87378 (D. Minn. 2013) (holding that a Corps JD is not final agency action); Nat'l Ass'n of Home
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In 2016, however, the applicability of Sackett was broadened under United
States Any Coips of Engineers v. Hawkes, Co., Inc. ("Hawkes") to entitle a
party to immediate judicial review, not only in the context of "compliance orders," but in response to an official Corps "Jurisdictional Determination"
("JD")." In Hawkes, a Minnesota peat miner seeking to expand his operations
to an adjacent property was issued a JD by the Corps asserting jurisdiction due
to a "significant nexus" between his property and a river located 120 miles away
"through a series of culverts and unnamed streams."7 Hawkes hired an independent wetland consultant to conduct an impartial review of its property, ultimately identifying several errors in the JD and concluding that no significant
connection existed from the property's wetland to the river.7 Hawkes thereafter
successfully appealed the JD within the Corps," with the reviewing officer finding the Corps lacked "sufficient documentation/analysis to support a finding of
Clean Water ActJurisdiction."' Notwithstanding the appeal's conclusion, two
months later the Corps issued a revised JD, which not only failed to "contain
additional data" and "correct the deficiencies," but ultimately upheld the Corps'
initial assertion of jurisdiction on the same generalized basis of Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus" test."
Hawkes subsequently filed suit challenging the JD, arguing that under the
Administrative Procedure Act, JDs, like the compliance orders in Sackett, had
binding legal consequences and, as evidenced by the mishandled internal appellate procedure, potentially left landowners without an alternative venue to
challenge a Corps determination." Though the issue before the Court, like in
Sackett, centered again on whether an individual was entitled to judicial review
before agency enforcement, nearly every point of discussion surrounding the
underlying CWA ambiguity was adversarial, if not hostile. At oral arguments,
Justice Kennedy seemed to retract his former support of the "significant nexus"
test, suggesting the CWA is "arguably unconstitutionally vague, and certainly
harsh in the civil and criminal sanctions it puts into practice."' Justice Breyer
seemed wary of the EPA's position in a "vast Federal Government," focusing
'

Builders v. EPA, 956 F.Supp.2d 198, 209-212 (D.D.C. 2013) (explaining that a Corps determination that a property contains traditional navigable waters is practically indistinguishable from a
JD and thus is not final agency action)" (citations omitted)).
77. See Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1813-14; see also 33 C.F.R. § 331.2 (defining a "jurisdictional
determination" as a "written Corps determination that a wedand ... is subject to regulatoryjurisdiction.").
78. Brief for Respondents at 8, U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807
(2016) (No. 15-290), 2016 WL 750545, at *11-12.
79. Id.
80. I-awkcs, 136 S. Ct. at 1813; Brief for Respondents at 5, United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016) (No. 15-290), 2016 WL 750545, at *4 (citing 33
C.F.R. § 331.2 (timely appeal of aJID to dispute a "waters of the United States" finding is permissible under regulation)).
81. Brief for Respondents at 8, U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807
(2016) (No. 15-290), 2016 WL 750545, at *12-13.

82.

Id. at 9.

83. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44-46, U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., 136
U.S. 1807 (2016) (No. 15-290).
84. Id. at 18.

Issue 2

DREDGING THE CLEAN WATER ACT

315

on the public policy implications of any agency determination not subject to
judicial review "on penalty of going to jail [or paying exorbitant civil penalties]
if they don't just follow it."' When the Court unanimously decided in favor of
Hawkes, Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito penned a concurring opinion to
discuss the "waters of the United States" ambiguity where the Court's opinion
was otherwise silent, stating "the reach and systemic consequences of the [Act]
remain a cause for concern."' The three further questioned "whether the
[CWA] comports with due process" and ultimately concluded that it "continues
to raise troubling questions regarding the Government's power to cast doubt on
the full use and enjoyment of private property throughout the Nation.""
To that end, the back-to-back unanimous decisions from Sackett and
Hawkes underscored the Court's newfound, unified agreement in restricting the
legal consequences flowing from the "waters of the United States" ambiguity,
rather than attempting to explicitly redefine its scope directly as it had in Rapanos, SWANNC, and Riverside Bayview. And, thus far, unlike the historical
tendency for lower courts to construe these CWA decisions narrowly, postHawkes cases have proven remarkably wide-ranging; even going so far as establishing precedent for agency actions in wholly unrelated fields.' In fact, just one
week after Hawkes, the Court remanded another challenge to the scope of
Corps jurisdiction under the CWA "for further consideration in light of"
Hawkes."

85. Id. at 22-23.
86. Hawkcs, 136 S. Ct. at 1816-17 (Kennedy, J., ThomasJ., Alito, J., concuriing).
87. Id. at 1817.
88. See Russell Prugh, The Legacy of Sackett v. EPA: Supreme CourtAllows Challenges to
WedandjuisdictionalDeterminations Under the Clean Water Act in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., MARTEN LAw: NEwsLETTER (Nov. 28, 2016), http://www.martenlaw.co
m/newsletter/20161128-wetland-jurisdictional-determination-cwa#_edn9.
89. See Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 761 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2014)
vacated, cert. granted, sub nom. Kent Recycling Servs., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
136 S. Ct. 2427 (2016). In Kent Recycling, a company attempted to purchase property in Louisiana to build a waste disposal facility. Incumbent to its decision to purchase this particular parcel
was the fact that the Corps had already deemed this property exempt under the agricultural exemption of the CWA. Petitioner argues the Corps changed its longstanding rule in response to
learning of Kent Recycling's plans and in order to demand a permit before the company could
proceed with its intended project. Kent Recycling was able to administratively appeal the Corps
determination, but even after a superior officer at the Corps reviewed the case finding insufficient
evidence the parcel had waters of the United States, the lower level District Engineer overruled
the appeal. Seeking judicial review, Kent Recycling was told by the Fifth Circuit that landowners
did not have the right to contest federal jurisdiction under the CWA. But following the Hawkes
decision, which now preempts the Fifth Circuit holding, the case was remanded.
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B. THE BACKGROUND AND BACKROOM DEALINGS OF THE WOTUS
RULE'

When Congress first passed the Clean Water Act in 1972, it was intended
only to cover "navigable waters."" As noted by the body of case law above,
determining where these waters existed was, at minimum, tenuous, as individuals having "never seen a ship or other vessel cross their yard" somehow found
themselves and their property subject to EPA juisdicion." Thus far, the Court
has failed to resolve the ambiguity, in part because of its inability to form a consensus around a definition. Without clear direction from the Court, determining where "waters of the United States" exist has been left to the EPA and
Corps' discretion on a "case-by-case basis."" The agencies failed to promulgate
a rule clarifying the ambiguity until 2015, requiring the public to rely on informal guidance memoranda published periodically to determine their interpretation of the CWA's scope.
Following the SWANCC Court's attempt to curtail jurisdiction under the
CWA, the Corps notified its staff that it would interpret the Court's ruling narrowly. The Corps reasoned that because the decision did not directly address
"tributaries" nor overrule Riverside Bayview, which expanded their reach beyond traditionally navigable waters, they "should continue to assert jurisdiction
over . . . tributary systems (and adjacent wetlands)" as well as "neighboring"
navigable waters and tributaries." Two years after the Court's more significant
attempt to limit CWA reach in Rapanos, the EPA and Corps promulgated a
memorandum to provide an updated guidance on their interpretation of CWA
jurisdiction." In it, the Agencies disregarded the Court's holding in favor of

90. As an administrative agency under direction of the executive branch, the EPA finds itself
inherently politicized. Regardless of a president's ideological leaning, the EPA derives its expansive power through interpretations of its own regulations. Indeed, while the EPA was established
under Republican Richard Nixon, challenges to EPA power largely began at the turn of the nillennium under the Bush administration ripening significantly under the Obarna administration;

See Elizabeth Slattery, Who Will Regulate the RegulatorsPAdministrative Agencies, the SeparaLion of Powers, and Chevron Deference, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (May 7, 2015), http://w
ww.heritage.org/courts/report/who-will-regulate-the-regulators-administrative-agencies-the-separation-powers-and.

91. United States v. Riverside Bavview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985) ("[Clongress evidently intended to repudiate limits that had been placed on federal regulation by earlier water
pollution control statutes and to exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate at
least some waters that would not be deemed 'navigable' under the classical understanding of that
term.").
92.

See Mark Sherman, Court sides with property owners over EPA, SAN DIEGO UNION

TRIBUNE (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.sandiegouniontiibune.com/sdut-court-sides-with-propertyowners-over-epa-2012mar21 -story.htnl.

93. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370 (2012).
94. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition
of "Waters of the United States", 68 Fed. Reg. 1991-98 (proposed Jan. 15, 2003).
95. EPA, CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION FOLLOWING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S
DECISION IN RAPANOS v. UNITED STATES & CARABELL V. UNITED STATES (2007), available at

https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-02/documents/cwa
panos120208.pdf [hereinafter GUIDANCE MEMO].
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Justice Kennedy's concurrence' and adopted a modified version of his "significant nexus" test in repudiation of Justice Scalia and a plurality of the Court.
Nevertheless, even though the Agencies failed to adhere to the Court's more
stringent plurality interpretation, the adoption of the significant nexus test still
underscored a slight concession and willingness to reduce their own jurisdictional reach of CWA authority with the burden of establishing a connection.
Approximately one month after President Obaia took office, the EPA
held its first principal meeting to announce its intention to pursue a formal "waters of the United States rule" ("WOTUS" rule).' Under the new administration, the EPA and Corps released a revised guidance to replace the former guidance under President Bush, stating "the extent of waters over which the agencies
assert jurisdiction under the CWA will increase compared to the extent of waters over which jurisdiction has been asserted under [the 20081 guidance."'
Public response argued the revised guidance had misconstrued the holdings in
Rapanos and SWANCC and urged the Agencies to replace this non-binding
guidance with a fornal regulation to define "waters of the United States" subject
to full notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures."
The EPA agreed, but to promulgate its new WOTUS rule the agency
needed evidentiary support to for its scientific basis. So, in July 2013, the
EPA assembled a Scientific Advisory Board to provide an expert scientific peer
review of its own study determining when a significant nexus existed to undergird the scientific reasoning behind the WOTUS rule.' Yet before the connectivity report was reviewed, the EPA and Corps sent a draft WOTUS rule,
essentially a repackaged version of the 2011 guidance, to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA")." The EPA's Scientific Advisory

96. See id.; see also Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739-42 (2006) (the plurality
concluded jurisdiction extended only to "relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing
bodies of water" and to "wetlands with a continuous surface connection" to same.).
97. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 757, 787 (the plurality remanded to determine "whether the
ditches and drains near each wetland are 'waters'" and "whether the wetlands in question are
'adjacent' to these 'waters' in the sense of possessing a continuous surface connection" andJustice
Kennedy's basis for remand focused on "whether the specific wetlands at issue possess a significant nexus with navigable waters"); see also GUIDANCE MEMO, supra note 95 (the Agency expanded [Justice Kennedy's] "significant nexus" analysis by incorporating "considerations of hydrologic and ecologic factors" into the test.).
98. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND Gov'T REFORM, 114" CONG., MAJORITY STAFF REP. ON
PoIuTICIZATION OF THE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATEs RULEMAKING 14 (Oct. 27, 2016),

available at https://oversight.house.gov/wp-contcint/uploads/2016/10/WOTUS-OGR-Report-fin
al-for-release-1 814-Logo-1.pdf.
99. Id. at 14-15 (citing EPA, DRAFr GUIDANCE ON IDENTIFYING WATERS PROTECTED BY
THE CLEAJN WATER ACT 3 (2011), https://www.regulations.gov/docuiment?D-EPA-HQ-OW-20
11-0409-0002 (emphasis added)).
100.

COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOv'T REFORM REP., supranote 98, at 15.

101. Id. at 16-17 (The Report discusses the current scientific understanding of the connections or isolation of streams and wetlands relative to large bodies of water. Worth noting, on
November 6, 2013, Chairman Lamar Smith of the House Committee on Science, Space and
Technology requested that the SAB provide explanations as to why it had failed to address the
"significance of these connections to the health and integrity of downstream waters" in its review
of the Connectivity Report.).
102. Id. at 1 (OIRA is the executive branch agency which reviews all significant draft regulations).
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Board failed to complete its peer review of the report until five months after the
agency published the WOTUS rule in the FederalRegister.'" In other words,
"the scientific understanding behind the rule was completed after the rule was
published."... Moreover, the EPA unlawfully used social media to generate public support for the WOTUS rule just prior to and throughout the comment
period."' Relying solely on its own science, the final rule enumerated eight covered water bodies, some of which"' were deemed jurisdictional by rule without
further analysis "because the science confirm[ed] that they have a significant
nexus" to other jurisdictional water features."' Thus, the science used to undergird the rule is codified in the final rule, which validates the agency's jurisdictional reach to interpret more ambiguous waters.
In spite of new concerns from the Court that the rule could "put the property rights of ordinary Americans entirely at the mercy of EPA employees,""
on May 26, 2015, OIRA finished its review of the WOTUS rule merely 50 days
after receiving the final draft.'" The final WOTUS rule was soon published in
the FederalRegister, taking legal effect on August 28, 2015."o The final rule
enumerates eight water bodies under CWA jurisdiction: (1) traditional navigable waters; (2) interstate waters; (3) territorial seas; (4) impoundments of jurisdictional waters; (5) tributaries; (6) adjacent waters; (7) waters found after a casespecific analysis to have a significant nexus to the first three; and (8) waters found
to have a significant nexus in combination with similarly situated waters in the
region.'' The first six are "jurisdictional by rule" for which "no additional analysis is required.""' The EPA further claimed that "fewer waters will be defined
as 'waters of the United States'" despite the increasing jurisdiction over some
117 million more landowners."'
A U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform published a scathing report of the WOTUS rule highlighting
where the EPA took legal shortcuts, implemented predetermined conclusions,
and advanced the rule based on political, rather than scientific, motivations.'
In one instance, it found that the government's clarified definition of "waters of
the United States" imposed an "arbitrary standard whereby waters within 4,000

103. Id. at 17-18.
104. Id. at 18.
105. Id. at 17 (The Government Accountability Office concluded that the EPA's use of social
media to create a viral #Ditchthemyth campaign violated law during FYs 2014 and 2015.).
106. Examples include "tributaries" and "adjacent" waters.
107. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of "Waters of the United States," Reg. Identifier No.
2040-AF30, Docket ID: EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0880-20862, https://www.regulations.gov/docket?
D-EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0880 [hereinafter Final Rule].
108. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 375 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (further stating that
under the rule "any piece of land that is wet at least part of the year is in danger of being classified
by EPA employees as wetlands covered by the Act.").
109. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND Gov'T REFORM, supra note 98, at 21.
110. Id. at 22.
111. Final Rule, supra note 107, at 37058.
112. Id.
113. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND Gov'T REFORM, supra note 98, at 2.
114. Id. at 1, 3.
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feet from any jurisdictional water would be covered.""' The Committee found
that the "vast majority of the nation's water features are located within 4,000 feet

of a jurisdictional water and blamed the rulemaking on "ideological policy
agenda" used to "override regulatory safeguards put in place by Congress.""
The judiciary seemed to agree, questioning the constitutionality of the WOTUS
rule in Hawkes." On October 9, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit issued a nationwide stay of the WOTUS rule "pending resolution of
claims that the rule is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law."" Two months
later, the U.S. Government Accountability Office released another report finding impropriety at the EPA regarding the WOTUS rule, this time finding that
it had violated the anti-lobbying provision of the Financial Services and General
Government Appropriations Act when it used appropriated funds for proWOTUS lobbying activities."
By issuing a preliminary injunction staying enforcement of the WOTUS rule
nationwide, the Sixth Circuit demonstrated that it was "skeptical of the brightline distance limitations associated with terms like 'adjacent waters' and 'significant nexus"' that the rule adopted." The Sixth Circuit appeared shocked by
the "sheer breadth of the ripple effects caused by the Rule's definitional
changes" and found "the rulemaking process" with its questionable scientific
basis was "facially suspect.""' Lastly, the WOTUS rule conflicts with Rapanos,
in that rather than the EPA making case-by-case determinations, it categorically
confers jurisdiction.'"
III. ANALYSIS

A. THE ABUSE OF CHEVRON DEFERENCE
One of the primary faults with the Clean Water Act is procedural; where a
statutory ambiguity exists, a court applies the two-pronged Chevron deference
analysis to determine whether an agency's interpretation is reasonable.'" First,
a court must determine whether an ambiguity exists or if Congress has already
adequately or expressly addressed the particular issue.' If Congress was either
115.

Id.at2,28.

116.

Id. at 3.

117. Hawkcs, 136 S. Ct. at 1816-1817 (KennedyJ., Thomas,J., Alito,J. concurring).
118. Id. at 1812 n.1; See In rc El1, 803 F.3d 804, 807-09 (6th Cir. 2015).
119. Letter from Susan A. Poling, Gen. Counsel, Gov't Accountability Office, to the Honorable James M. Inhofe, Chairman, Comm'n on Env't and Pub. Works, U.S. Senate (Dec. 14,
2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674163.pdf.
120. In re EPA, 803 F.3d at 804-08; Respondents' Brief in Support of Certiorari at 3, Nat'1
Ass'n of Mfrs. v. DOD, 137 S.Ct. 811 (2016) (No. 16-299), 2016 WL 5900123 at *3.
121. In re EPA, 803 F.3d at 807-08.
122. Respondents' Brief in Support of Certiorari at 3, 5, Nat'1 Ass'n of Mfrs. v. DOD, 137
S.Ct. 811 (2016) (No. 16-299), 2016 WL .5900123 at *3, *5.
123. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (concept of Chevron
deference borne out of a challenge to the EPA's interpretation of "stationary sources" in the
Clean Air Act).
124. Elizabeth Slattery, Who Will Regulate the ReguilatorsAdministrativeAgencies, the Separationof Powers, and Chevron Deference, HERITAGE FOUND., May 7, 2015, at 4, http://www.
heritage.org/research/reports/2015/05/who-will-regulate-the-regulators-administrative-agencies-
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silent or ambiguous, a court turns to the second prong to decide whether an
agency's interpretation is reasonable under the circumstances." It is well established that agencies delegated rulemaking authority under a statute are "afforded generous leeway by the courts in interpreting the statute they are entrusted to administer."12

Decided just one year prior to the first CWA challenge in Riverside
Bayview, Chevron deference has conferred considerable latitude to agency discretion over its own regulations." And while the broad implications of Chevron
deference are worthy of weighty analysis on their own, the CWA stands tall
among the minority of legal challenges which may actually fail the historically
generous leeway courts give to construing what an agency considers reasonable.
Since its initial holding in 1984, however, Chevron deference was expanded
recently in 2013 under City ofArlington v. Federal Communications Commission from upholding agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language to
now permitting agency interpretations of the scope of its authority.' And while
this recent expansion has been subject to dissent,'" its lawful standing may have
laid the foundation to justify the unchecked growth of CWA jurisdiction it
sought to curtail in Rapanos and Sackett. To that end, the latest iteration of
Chevron deference may prove unworkable in narrowing the CWA's scope."
Instead, perhaps future courts should heed Chief justice Roberts' dissent
in FederalCommunications Commission, abide by the original Chevron deference standards as applied to CWA challenges, and focus solely on whether the
EPA's or Corps' interpretation of "navigable waters" or "waters of the United
States" is reasonable under the circumstances. Under this traditional analysis,
future challenges brought before the Court can easily affirm the Rapanos holding that the Agencies' "expansive interpretation of the 'waters of the United
States' is thus not 'based on a permissible construction of the statute.""3 In
Rapanos, ChiefJustice Roberts furthered the majority's discussion of Chevron
deference in a concurrence, finding that Congress had indeed employed sufficient limiting terms in the CWA language and the Agencies' incompetence signaled "another defeat for the agency."' Under Chevron deference, he asserted
that the EPA and Corps "would have enjoyed plenty of room to operate in
developing some notion of an outer bound to the reach of their authority,"
the-separation-of-powers-and-chevron-deference#_ftn24.

125.

Id.

126. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-845).
127. See Slattery, supra note 124, at 3, 4.
128. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
129. Id. at 1883 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting) (finding "whether Congress wants us to [interpret
an ambiguous provision] is a question that courts, not agencies, must decide.").
130. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co.,
Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016) (No. 15-290). There, Justice Kagan questioned the soundness of
applying Chevron deference to the quasi-binding jurisdictional determinations, uncertain of
whether they were "final" and subject to Chevron deference, or whether they are "the kinds of
advisory-type rulings that are not final" and thus not subject to Chevron deference.
131. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 739 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
132. Id. at 758 (Roberts, CJ., concurring).
133. Id.
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but instead of "refining its view of its authority in light of our decision in
SWANCC. .. the Corps chose to adhere to its essentially boundless view of
the scope of its power."
B. DAMNED IF YOU DO, DAMNED IF YOU DON'T: THE PROBLEM WITH
GIVING THE EPA THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT AND THE RISE OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

The evolution of Chevron deference, alongside the "waters of the United
States" debate, begs the obvious question: why would the EPA voluntarily undertake more work asserting jurisdiction over such trivial matters? It would be
overly simplistic to dismiss the more absurd cases" as anomalies or occasional
oversights inherent to a bureaucracy of its size. Instead, even an ideologically
divided Court seems unified in skepticism of the EPA's true motives. Most recently, Chief Justice Roberts during oral arguments in Hawkes attempted to
articulate a possible incentive:
[Bly issuing the determinations, they are able to exercise extraordinary
leverage without going through the formal enforcement process.... [Ilt
is a way for them to exercise their authority without effective judicial
review. And that's a significant enforcement tool for them. So they
might be unwilling to give it up if they had the option.
-

Justice Alito went even further, suggesting the Corps was not merely acting "out
of the goodness of its heart," but rather the requisite permitting process was
driven by a significant profit motive." He claimed the notion of providing a
landowner with a jurisdictional determination was not a product of "just
want[ing] to be nice to landowners," but rather that the determinations are selfserving:
[Tihey do this for their own purposes because ... it expands their enforcement power, because landowners who have a question about the
status of their land have strong incentive to ask for a jurisdictional determination. And if-so that alerts the Corps to the fact that this is a
property that might be subject to their jurisdiction."
These comments seem to undergird the Court's skepticism of EPA motives and
a wanness about handing over unchecked power to an agency willing to abuse
Chevron deference.

134. Id.
135. See Ilan Wurman, Consttudonal Administration, 69 STAN. L. REv. 359, 361 (2017).
The administrative state refers, most commonly, to when a government agency circumvents the
separation of powers by effectively creating, enforcing, and interpreting their own rules.
136. See supra Part II and discussion.
137. Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., Inc.,
136 S. CL 1807 (2016) (No. 15-290).

138.

Id. at 39.

139.

Id.
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To that end, Justice Alito's comments may speak to the heart of EPA motive, underscoring the EPA's efficient business model: one where the Corps
need not seek out jurisdictional water bodies on a case-by-case basis as previously articulated in Sackett, but rather rely on incoming applications to create a
built-in presumption of a likely violative water feature. In 2015 alone, the Corps
issued an estimated 54,000 nationwide permits and 3,100 individual permits."
These numbers, when coupled with the Rapanos Court's finding that the average applicant obtaining a permit "spends 788 days and $271,596 in completing
the process,"'' result in EPA annual revenues averaging more than $15,000,000
purely from landowners attempting to comply with a vague statute. The costs
of noncompliance are similarly unreasonable, as just four years earlier the Sackett Court demonstrated failure to receive a permit subjected landowners to fines
of up to $75,000 per day.4 Until Sackett and Hawkes, these noncompliant
landowners had no relief from these fines while attempting to dispute a determination; in one such case, fines reached nearly $20 million before the EPA
conceded its own failure to identify a stock pond as a valid exemption to the
CWA.'
Setting aside the issues of attaching presumptive guilt to landowners merely
seeking compliance, at least under the scheme in Hawkes, subsequent determinations were conducted on a "case-by-case basis by EPA field staff."'" Yet a
new decision pending certiorari, Fosterv. Vilsack, centers on the latest practice

140. The Scope of PLF's Hawkes Co. Case Could Have Implications for Millions of Landowners, Courting Liberty, PAC. LEGAL FOUND. (Mar. 9, 2016), http://blog.pacificlegal.org/the-

scope-of-p~lfs-haw,,kes-co-supreme-court-case-could-hav~e-imi-plicationis-for-millionis-of-lanldownvers/.
141. See Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1812 (finding "[elven more readily available 'general' permits
took applicants, on average, 313 days and $28,915 to complete."). General permits are limited to
activities that "cause only minimal individual and cumulative environmental impacts." 33 C.F.R.
§ 323.2(h)(1).
142. See Sacket, 132 S. Ct. at 1375 ("The EPA may issue a compliance order demanding that
the owncrs cease construction, engage in expensive remedial measures, and abandon any use of
the property. If the owners do not do the EPA's bidding, they may be fined up to $75,000 per
day ($37,500 for violating the Act and another $37,500 for violating the compliance order).").
143. See Andyjohnson v. United States EnvironmentalProtection Agency (2015), COMPLAINT FOR DECL. & INJ. RELIEF available at http://www.pacificlegal.org/document.docid- 2036.
144. Sackctt, 132 S. Ct. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring) ("But far from providing clarity and
predictability, the agency's latest informal guidance advises property owners that many jurisdictional determinations concerning wetlands can only be made on a case-by-case basis by EPA field
staff.").
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undertaken by the Corps wherein a determination is adjudged from a pre-designated wetland." At issue in Fosteris whether an agency can establish jurisdictional wetlands solely by comparison to a preselected violative site." Instead of
acting on a case-by-case basis, the Corps in Fosterapplied a 10,835 square mile
region as a proxy to determine whether a wetland was in violation of the CWA.'
Rather than looking at the farm itself or even an adjacent or otherwise comparable comparison site, Foster demonstrates at least one example where the
Corps uses a comparison site found in violation sixteen years prior any time it
investigates a water feature in the surrounding 10,835 square miles.". The Fosters argued that this "wetlands by proxy" determination violated due process in
two ways. First, the Fosters were not entitled to notice or an opportunity to hold
a hearing on the selection of the reference site despite the government's adjudication of their property rights. Second, "that the [U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit] showed too much deference when it declined to second-guess
the bureaucrats' unfair process.""" To that end, should the U.S. Supreme Court
decide to rule on Foster, it should do so in a deliberately broad manner discussing the Agency's interpretation of "wetlands" to encompass the CWA and not
just the Food Security Act in question. Fosterhas the potential to be instructive
to future courts adjudicating CWA challenges so long as it includes a robust
analysis of Chevron deference in the context of the EPA. It must do so in light
of the implications of the recently expanded construction of Chevron deference
pernitting the EPA and Corps to interpret their own authority if it desires to
resolve the ambiguity in a meaningful way."o Should the Court find the EPA's
interpretation of "wetlands" unreasonable under Chevron deference in Foster,

145. Foster v. Vilsack, PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI, http://www.pacificlegal.org/file
/documents/Foster-1-1523-Cert-Petition.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2017) (Arlen and Cindy Foster
are a Midwest farming couple who inherited a family property which had been in their family
since 1900. As farmers raising cattle on the property, they attempted to comply with a federal
law administered by the Department of Agriculture that limits farming in wetlands. The wetlands
in question were a small, shallow depression. The Act at issue was not the CWA, but instead a
provision of the Food Security Act of 1985. Under the Act, wetlands were defined as "having
three characteristics: wetland soils, wetland hydrology, and wetland plants." At issue in Foster
was whether their removal of vegetation had tampered with the wetland plants. In rendering this
determination, the Department, through the National Resources Conservation Service, is required to conduct farm inspections. If a determination cannot be made from an inspection, the
National Resources Conservation Service then looks to whether "a prevalence of hydrophytic
vegetation typically exists in the local area on the same hydric soil map under non-altered hydrologic conditions.".); see also 7 C.F.R. 12.31 (b)(2)(ii).
146. Anthony Francois, High Court asked to hearsuit over feds' rigged scheme for "discovering" wetlands, PAC. LEGAL FOUND. (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.pacificlegal.org/releases/release8-10-16-foster-1-1523 ("The comparison site, which was employed in a lazy and arbitrary way to
label their property as wetlands, is used for the same purpose throughout much of eastern South
Dakota. This comparison site was preselected 16 years ago with the knowledge that it supports
wetland plants. Now federal officials use it anytime they are investigating a possible wetland with
similar soils and disturbed vegetation, anywhere in the surrounding 10,835 square miles.").
147. Foster v. Vilsack, supra note 145, at 11.
148. See Francois, supra note 146.
149. Id.
150. PLFChallenges the Feds'RiggedScheme For"Discovering"Wetlands, CourtingLiberty,
PAC. LEGAL FOUND. (Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.pacificlegal.org/8-10-16-Podcast.
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subsequent courts may be able to more uniformly apply Chevion deference in
challenges under the CWA.
C. THE EPA DRIVES THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Integral to our Constitution is the articulation of the separation of powers."
The founders contemplated a three-tiered. government wherein specific powers
were designated to each branch with the understanding that their susceptibility
to the election process would overcome any inequities." Today, the term "administrative state" refers to the accumulation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers inside of an administrative agency." In sum, "[tloo many important
decisions of the Federal Government are made nowadays by unelected agency
officials ... rather than by the people's representatives in Congress.""
In 2011, Justice Stephen Breyer penned a law review article articulating the
rise of the administrative state and flaws therein:
Political appointees, often not experts, are normally responsible for
managing agencies and determining policy. And policy often reflects
political, not simply "scientific," considerations. Agency decisions will
also occasionally reflect "tunnel vision," an agency's supreme confidence in the importance of its own mission to the point where it leaves
common sense aside. At the same time, courts no longer seem particularly hostile to regulation as a matter of principle. Hence, the public
now relies more heavily on courts to ensure the fairness and rationality
of agency decisions.55
Recent unanimous decisions may indicate that the Court, at least with respect
to the CWA, remains stalwart in its narrowing of the Act's regulatory reach.
Whereas the WOTUS rule, with its questionable scientific basis, reflects the
agency myopia against which Justice Breyer cautioned. To that end, as Breyer
notes, private landowners, farmers, and businesses now rely on the Court to roll
back the reach of the CWA and the EPA's operation outside of our three-tiers
of government, or otherwise risk an accumulation of power the likes of which
James Madison labeled the "very definition of tyranny.""
In the executive branch, the separation of powers is intended to ameliorate
"agency slack by reducing the possibility that a biased or parochial interest group

151. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 354 (james Madison) (Floating Press ed., 2011) (writing
that "[TIhe combination of all powers legislative, executive, and judiciary in the same hands ...
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.").
152. SeeJide 0. Nzelibe & Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints:Separation
ofPowers, Rational Voting, and ConstitutionalDesign, 123 HARv. L. REV. 617, 619 (2010) (finding "[ellectoral accountability ameliorates agency slack by punishing poorly performing incumbents and rewarding successful ones.").
153. Sec Wurman, supra note 135, at 361.
154. EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1610 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
155. Stephen Breyer, The Executive Branch, AdministrativeAction, and Comparative Expertise, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2189, 2195 (2011).
156. Id. at 2193; seeJames Madison, supra note 151, at 354.
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will be able to use the power of the state for its own ends."3 7 This intent and

exposure to electoral accountability, however, is noticeably attenuated in the
context of administrative agencies such as the EPA.` For the moment, it appears as though the holdings from Sackeu and Hawkes, at minimum, have
helped to mitigate these issues by drawing attention to potential due process
violations under the CWA as well as relief through judicial review,"" but there
still exists a presumption and strong deference under administrative law that the
federal agency's ruling is both reasonable and final.'" The EPA appears to be
the poster child for federal agencies exercising all three powers in violation of
our constitution.
"Though typically categorized as part of the executive branch, administrative agencies perform legislative, executive, and judicial functions by issuing, enforcing, and settling disputes involving regulations that have the force of law."'.'
In that regard, the EPA's intended purpose, as an agency of the executive
branch, primarily rests with a power to enact and enforce regulations in furtherance of its stated environmental purpose. Under Chevron deference, however,
the Corps has enforced and now promulgated a rule so broadly construed that
most of the country can plausibly fit under its jurisdiction.` This rulemaking
ability, in turn, has led to circumvention of the traditional separation of powers
wherein the EPA finds itself insulated from misconduct accountability." Moreover, under the current administrative state regime, landowners who disagree
with the EPA or Corps have little relief and even less influence in ousting the
decision makers therein."'
157. See Nzelibe & Stephenson, supra note 152, at 619.
158. Under Democrat and Republican administrations alike, as reflected in the 2003, 2008,
and 2011 guidance memoranda, the EPA continued to expand its jurisdictional reach largely
removed from judicial limitations and Chief executive ideology. Consider the following process:
Congress may pass a law that an administrative agency finds inadequately detailed to enforce. In
such circumstances, Congress may delegate authority to the agency to engage in finalizing the

rulemaking, which, in turn, is given the force of law. More troublesome still, the administrative
agencies have come to interpret their own regulations, calling individuals before the administrative
agency to determine whether someone is in violation. These rulings, in turn, may then become

binding on those individuals.
159. See Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1817 (tinding that, in many instances, a jurisdictional determination "will have a significant bearing on whether the Clean Water Act comports with due process.").

160. See U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985) (citing Chevron,
467 U.S. at 842-45).
161.

See Slattery, supra note 124, at 2.

162. Taking Dead Aim at The Growth of the Administrdtive State, Courting Liberty, PAC.
LEGAL FOUND. (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.pacificlegal.org/1 1-1 6-16-podcast.
163. See THE FEDERALIST No.52, at 388-89 (James Madison) (Floating Press ed., 2011) (writing that "it is particularly essential that [Congressl should have an immediate dependence on, and
an intimate sympathy with the people. Frequent elections are unquestionablythe only policy by
which this dependence and sympathy can be secured.") (emphasis added); see also Joseph
Postell, From Administrative State to Constitutional Government, HERITAGE FOUND., Dec. 7,
2012, at 15, http://www.hcritage.org/political-process/report/administrative-state-constitutionalgovernment (finding the "only way to ensure that representatives have a common interest with

the people to whom they are supposed to be responsible is the establishment of regular elections,
and it is particularly essential that the legislature be subject to regular elections.") (internal quota-

tion marks omitted).
164. Postell, supra note 163, at 16.
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In addition to writing and enforcing its own rules, federal agencies under
the direction of the EPA have taken on a role traditionally held by the courts
by establishing tribunals whose determinations can have a legally binding effect." The jurisdictional determinations at issue in both Hawkes and Sackett,
were shown to have a legally binding effect without being subject to judicial review or scrutiny.'" In turn, the Corps is authorized with determining violations
under the CWA, either by way of failing to get a permit or by violating the permit 6 Further, after the determination that a violation has occurred, the individual is not entitled to a hearing." The agency is not required to take you to
court to establish you violated the law.' You are not entitled to a hearing before
or after the agency decides you have broken the law.7 Instead of an objective
magistrate, oftentimes ajunior official at the local Army Corps of Engineers will
interpret your case.
7

1

IV. CONCLUSION
For the first time since its creation, it now seems as though the Court, Congress,'" and the current President' are unified in their stance on curtailing the
CWA's reach under the vague "waters of the United States" language. To that
end, both the WOTUS rule and ever-expanding jurisdiction of the EPA and
Corps under the CWA may be coming to an end. Irrespective of its ability to
address legitimate climate and environmental concerns, the agencies have unequivocally abused their powers beyond their once legitimate reach, which now
threatens our founding principles.
Yet while Congress and President Trump appear eager to weigh in on the
"waters of the United States" conversation, it would be unwise to presume the
demise of the "waters of the United States" ambiguity simply from campaign
promises and a Republican Congress. Instead, if history is instructive, the ambiguity will more likely remain unresolved within the court system until the Supreme Court has an opportunity to hear the agencies' new WOTUS rule. In
that respect, subsequent Court discussions should reflect more specifically on
165.

Taking Dead Aim at The Growth of the Administrative State, supra note 162.

166.

Id.

167.

Id.

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Talking Dead Aim at The Growth of the Administrative State, supra note 162.
171. Id.
172. Tilffny Stecker, Clean Water Rule: WOTUS 'Ultimately doomed.' What happens
next?, E&E NEwS, Nov. 16, 2016, at 2, http://www.eenews.netstories/1060045861 (suggesting
that the new Republican Congress may attack the CWA directly via legislation or by defunding
EPA activities in spending bills as they have indicated.).
173. See Clinton, Trump split over WOTUS, CAPITAL PRESS, Sep. 29, 2016, http://www.cap2
italpress.com/201609 9/clinton-trump-split-over-wotus (quoting President Trump "I will eliminate the unconstitutional Waters of the U.S. rule, and will direct the Army Corps of Engineers
and EPA to no longer use this unlawful rule and related guidance documents in making jurisdictional deteninations."); see also Clinton in Favor of WOTUS, Trunp Against, HOOSIER AG
TODAY, Sep. 22, 2016, https://wvw.hoosieragtoday.com/clinton-in-favor-of-wotus-trump-against/
(quoting President Trump as finding the WOTUS rule "so extreme that it gives federal agencies
control over creeks, small streams, and even puddles.").
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the evolution of case law on the topic to construct a more sensible outer framework for interpreting "waters of the United States."
To start, the Court should look to Riverside Bayview, understanding how
the Corps' argument of jurisdiction over "adjacent wetlands" was compelling at
the time, but divorced from the confusing "significant nexus" analysis that is
retroactively attributed to the case today. Furthermore, understanding the origins of "adjacent wetlands" outside of a "significant nexus" conversation will be
useful in analyzing the phrase's validity inside the WOTUS rule should it rise
from the Sixth Circuit to the High Court. Outside of Riverside Bayview, courts
can reflect on SWANCC and Rapanos taken together for instruction on when
the EPA and Corps failed Chevron deference and unreasonably interpreted the
Act. In particular, the Court should revisit the plurality's definition of "waters
of the United States" in Rapanos against the WOTUS rule. Perhaps in revisiting Rapanos, the Court can definitively reject Justice Kennedy's "significant
nexus" concurrence, an oft-cited analysis that even he no longer finds workable.
Finally, if unable to resolve the patent ambiguity, the Court can build upon the
precedent in Sackett and Hawkes to indirectly curtail the CWA's reach by ameliorating the improper legal consequences that flow from the language.
Despite an otherwise ideologically divided bench, the back-to-back unanimous holdings in Sackett and Hawkes signal a unified criticism of the EPA's
reach of authority under the CWA. With Justice Scalia's hard-hitting voice noticeably missing from the bench in Hawkes, it will be incumbent upon the Court
to find a timbre capable of sending a strong message to the EPA if confronted
with adjudicating the WOTUS rule. The time has come for the Court to end
the linguistic back and forth and afford landowners more opportunities to challenge the agencies. The EPA and Corps will be the ones inevitably waiting for
the Court to drop the hammer on their unreasonable "waters of the United
States" interpretations.

